The effects of being categorised: The interplay between internal and external social identities

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In this chapter, we consider the independent and interactive effects of internal categorisations (how people see themselves) and external categorisations (how they are categorised by others) on social behaviour. Our point of departure is that people do not necessarily accept external categorisations that are imposed upon them (regardless of whether these refer to artificially constructed or naturally occurring groups) and that this affects their willingness to invest in the group. We first outline different reasons people may have to behave in line with externally imposed group memberships. Subsequently, we examine how self-presentation motives may interfere with identity expression, as people consider different social norms, different audiences, and the psychological costs associated with the management of their social identities. We conclude by delineating the conditions under which external categorisations can be internalised by targets, depending on the interplay of multiple identities as well as the way people are treated by others.

In social psychology, considerable effort is devoted to examining whether it is possible to derive a better understanding of complex social phenomena by analysing them in terms of individual processes. One complication is that in real social situations, more often than not groups instead of individuals are the social actors, as a result of which people are likely to perceive themselves and others as well as behave in terms of their membership in these groups (for overviews see: Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997). The translation from individual to group-level phenomena, however, involves more than substituting individuals with groups as the relevant social entities. That is, in addition to establishing how interpersonal processes can be represented at the (inter-)group level, it is
crucial to understand how the individual is connected to the group, as this may moderate and interact with other relevant processes in important ways (see also Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999c, 2002).

When we look at the theoretical and research literature on group processes and intergroup relations, it is striking how little the interface between the individual and the group as such has been a focus of explicit consideration. More often than not people’s membership in particular groups (either ad hoc laboratory groups or real-life social categories) has been taken as a given, on the basis of which it is assumed that they will then, almost automatically, perceive their social environment and act in terms of that group membership. Those who examine the position of different individuals within the group, usually do this by considering how individual features (such as individual behaviour, personality traits, perceived competence, or task performance, e.g., Emler & Reicher, 1995; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Seta & Seta, 1996) objectively compare to group characteristics (cf. the notion of prototypicality, Hogg, 1996). Instead, our approach in this chapter is that of differentiating between different ways in which individuals subjectively relate to the group, and examining how this may influence their responses (see also Hinkle & Brown, 1990).

Specifically, our aim in the present chapter is to review the empirical evidence relevant to the issue of how discrepancies between internal (perspective of self) and external (perspective of others) social categorisations may influence people’s subjective identities and social behaviour. On the basis of theoretical notions of social categorisation and social identification that are relevant to the examination of the interplay between internal and external social identities, we develop the general proposition that while subjective identification is a primary predictor of the tendency to invest in group outcomes, external categorisations can often importantly influence how and when this behaviour is expressed. To illustrate the implications of this reasoning, we first explore what leads people to bring their behaviour in line with external categorisations. Second, we consider how self-presentational concerns impact upon identity expression by examining the effects of conflicting social norms, different audiences, and psychological costs of social identity management. Finally, we delineate how people may come to adapt their internal identities to external definitions of self, depending on the feasibility of maintaining multiple identities as well as the way they are treated by others.

INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL SOCIAL IDENTITIES

According to both these perspectives, neither identification (or self-categorisation) nor pro-group behaviour can be simply inferred from an external observation of which group an individual appears to belong to. Instead, social identification constitutes a subjective process through which externally assigned category distinctions are accepted and ingroup characteristics are adopted to help define the self. Although the distinction between internal identities and external categories is at the heart of these theories, the relationship between these two concepts has not been systematically investigated. Social identity theory tends to assume this internalisation and then addresses the motivational consequences of the acquired identity. Whereas self-categorisation theory focuses more explicitly on the activation of internal identities (e.g., Turner, 1982), as such the relationship between external and internal categorisations has not constituted a topic of systematic investigation.

Although theoretical statements do refer to possible differences in the way a particular individual is categorised by the self and by others, they mainly address mechanisms that may lead internal and external categorisations to converge in the end. For instance, Tajfel (1978) pointed out that when people are repeatedly treated by others in terms of a particular group membership, they are likely to internalise this definition of themselves eventually. For example, whereas migrants may initially aim to integrate with the host group, they may come to adopt or even embrace their ethnic identity in response to systematic ethnic categorisation by others, which will reinforce their segregation. Turner (1987) conversely, has argued that people may actively try to bring external perceptions of self in line with internalised self-categorisations, by behaving in terms of norms that are prototypical for the group that constitutes an important part of their self-definition. This process is illustrated by the general phenomenon that we tend to adapt our clothing or speech styles to induce others to perceive us as belonging to certain regional, professional, or age groups rather than others.

At the same time, it is obvious that there are many circumstances under which a particular social categorisation (by others) does not automatically elicit the corresponding social identification (of the self), or vice versa. The possibility that internal identities may not coincide with external categorisations stems from the fact that each individual can potentially be categorised in multiple ways (e.g., Van Rijswijk & Ellemers, 2002; Zarate & Smith, 1990), and the categorisation that is seen as important by oneself may not be the one that is salient for others. Indeed, these two categorisations often emerge from different processes, with motivational considerations coming into play when one’s own identity is at stake, while the cognitive salience of a particular category membership tends to determine its use by others. That is, external categorisations are most often elicited by the accessibility of visible cues, or the numerical distinctiveness
of group membership (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999b; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Kanter, 1977). At a cognitive level, these factors may have similar effects when looking from the perspective of the targets involved (e.g., McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978). However, it is not self-evident that subjective identities are primarily determined by those group memberships that are most visible or distinctive (see also Deaux, 1996; Tajfel, 1981). For instance, for a female executive, her gender is both clearly visible and likely to be numerically distinctive, making this a salient categorisation cue for herself as well as others around her. At the same time, in a work context, she may prefer to think of herself primarily in terms of her professional role, and focus on ways in which she is different from other women (e.g., Ellemers, Van den Heuvel, De Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, in press; Young, Van Knippenberg, Ellemers, & De Vries, 1997).

Because the different parties involved have another perspective on the social situation, they essentially judge the same target in a different comparative context (Oakes et al., 1994). In many situations, divergent categorisations of the same target are further encouraged because criteria for group membership are ambiguous (e.g., when inclusion in a particular religious group can alternatively be defined by birth, participation in childhood rituals, or adult religious activity), or because it is hard to unequivocally establish fulfilment of these criteria (when membership cues are not visible, as may be the case among homosexuals). However, even in the absence of such uncertainties, discrepancies between external categorisations and internal identities can emerge because people may have idiosyncratic views on how they wish to define the self in relation to others. That is, people take an active role in how they define themselves, by choosing whether or not they endorse an externally assigned categorisation, and by expressing this choice in their social interaction with others. As a result, it is even possible to define oneself on the basis of a category when one fulfils few of the criteria traditionally considered to define that identity. For instance, one can claim an organisational identity solely on the basis of a newly acquired employment position, without much membership history, or awareness of the norms that characterise this group.

In sum, one’s own definition of self (who you think you are: internal categorisation) does not necessarily correspond to the way one is perceived by others (who others think you are: external categorisation). This discrepancy can constitute a threat to the self—a categorisation threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Ellemers et al., 2002). The experience of a categorisation threat cannot be assumed by outside observers, as it is intrinsically connected to the target’s subjective sense of self. For instance, we cannot assume that being treated as a woman will
necessarily constitute an identity threat to a female executive, even in a professional setting. She may regard her gender either as essential to her work, if she perceives herself as a role model for other working women, or as irrelevant, if she sees herself as “one of the boys”, while she may adopt yet another definition of self (e.g., as a parent or as a friend) in other settings.

Research into how people deal with such discrepancies between internal and external sources of identity is scarce. An understanding of this process requires the examination of how people express their identities to others, as it is through identity expression that internal and external self-views are confronted. In the next section we illustrate the powerful role of internalised identities in determining whether or not individuals are motivated to behave as members of a given social category. Later we examine how people take into account external categorisations when they express their identities to others.

THE ROLE OF INTERNAL IDENTITIES

Identification with minimal and natural groups

Previous concerns that were raised regarding the possibility that externally assigned social categorisations are not internalised by the group members involved, have usually focused on the issue of whether results obtained with externally imposed laboratory groups (such as: analytic vs synthetic thinkers, global vs detailed perceivers, or simply the blue vs green group) have predictive value for the processes that are likely to occur with more internalised and meaningful group memberships (e.g., national groups, study majors, political interest groups). Indeed, previous attempts to systematically compare between these research paradigms suggest that different effects may emerge with minimal laboratory groups as compared to natural social categories (e.g., Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). While various explanations have been advanced (e.g., referring to multiple vs single comparison dimensions, Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983, 1984, or to an “open” situation vs social reality constraints; Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1999a), some have argued that the crucial difference is that people are generally less inclined to define the self as members of laboratory groups than in terms of natural social categories (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996).

It has to be acknowledged that minimal groups are unlikely to reflect in important ways upon the identity of the individuals outside the research laboratory. However, it is important to note that similar problems may emerge with natural groups. That is, while people may be unable to deny that they can be categorised in terms of a naturally occurring group
membership (such as their national group, or their work organisation) this
does not necessarily imply that they consider this an important part of their
self-definition. Thus, we would argue that these different kinds of groups
and categories should be seen as interchangeable from a theoretical point of
view, in the sense that—given the appropriate circumstances—it should be
possible to observe similar social identity processes in each of these kinds of
groups (e.g., Diehl, 1990).

Indeed, empirical data show that—in natural as well as laboratory
groups—only those who actually identify as group members are inclined to
describe themselves and act in terms of that group membership (e.g.,
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997).
Conversely, those who express lack of identification with the group
emphasise intra-group heterogeneity and differentiate the self from the
group, thus effectively undermining the usefulness of that categorisation as
a source of information about the self (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995;
Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). At the behavioural level,
group members who fail to incorporate the external categorisation into
their sense of self are more inclined to operate according to what best
serves their personal self-interest, relatively independently of their group
membership or the implications this may have for them. Again, these
differential responses depending on the degree of identification emerge
regardless of whether artificially constructed and temporary laboratory
groups are examined or whether reference is made to membership in more
enduring and naturally occurring social groups (for an overview see
Ellemers et al., 1999c).

Instead of focusing on the difference between laboratory groups and
natural groups as such, we therefore argue that it is important to consider
whether the social categorisation that is externally imposed by the researcher
(or by others outside the self) actually refers to those identity aspects that
have been internalised as relevant for the self, or conversely, whether people
can be expected to ignore or even resist being considered in terms of that
particular group membership. Thus, the perceived self-relevance of the
category under consideration should affect the likelihood that people
respond in terms of that group membership, independently of whether
artificially constructed or naturally occurring group memberships are
examined. To illustrate the implications of this reasoning, we will now
review research examining the circumstances under which individuals are
willing to invest in group outcomes.

Individual investment in group outcomes

Our argument so far would suggest that—in itself—an externally imposed
categorisation provides insufficient reason for individuals to act in terms of
their group membership, and that subjective identification with the group is necessary to induce such behavioural engagement. In an attempt to examine this proposition, in two studies Ellemers et al. (1997) categorised research participants either as “inductive thinkers” or as “deductive thinkers”, allegedly on the basis of their performance at a cognitive association test. Additionally, participants were led to believe that they either identified with or felt no particular ties to the group they had been assigned to. This manipulation was realised by informing research participants that the extent to which they identified with their group was indicated by the level of physiological arousal they displayed while working on a group decision task, which could be assessed through electrodes that had been attached to their hand at the outset of the experiment.

Regardless of whether the collective performance of the group had been worse than that of the other group (Study 1) or whether it remained unclear how the group had performed on the decision task (Study 2), the results of both studies consistently revealed that people’s responses to the externally imposed categorisation depended on whether or not they had been induced to identify with the group they had been assigned to. That is, mediational analyses showed that when the experimental instructions induced identification with the group, research participants reported feeling committed to the group, and as a result wanted to continue working with the group even when it had been unsuccessful in the past. Conversely, when the manipulations led participants to believe their identification with the group was lacking, they indicated less subjective commitment to the group, and accordingly expressed their preference to leave.

Similar observations were made by Doosje, Spears, and Ellemers (2002), in a study that examined how group members respond to temporal changes in a group status structure, that is, when changes in their subjective involvement in the group could actually be monitored as the group evolved over time. In this study too, research participants were categorised by the experimenter into temporary groups in which they performed a group problem-solving task. According to the bogus feedback they received, the initial position of their group was relatively low, however it was made clear that there was a concrete possibility of improving the group’s standing through concerted effort during the experiment. Again, only those who had accepted their inclusion in the group and actually identified with it displayed a willingness to work with the group. By contrast, those who failed to identify with the group they had been assigned to were less inclined to behave in terms of their group membership.

A correlational study among members of natural groups (defined according to study major), which asked psychology students to document the amount of time they spent on a variety of activities, shows converging results (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1998). Those who
identified strongly as psychology students reported spending more time on study-related behaviour (such as studying to prepare exams, attending classes), while students who considered the categorisation as psychology majors as less self-relevant were more likely to engage in other kinds of activities that were not related to their subject of study (e.g., socialising with friends).

In a series of experiments Ouwerkerk and his colleagues went one step further, as they assessed people’s actual performance on a collective task, in order to assess the conditions under which individual group members would exert themselves on behalf of the group (see Ouwerkerk, Ellemers, & De Gilder, 1999, for an overview). In these experiments, using artificially constructed (“global” vs “detailed” perceivers) as well as natural category memberships (based on study majors), it consistently turned out that only those who identified strongly with the group intended to exert themselves on behalf of the group (Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002), and actually showed an improved performance at a collective task (Ouwerkerk, De Gilder, & De Vries, 2000). Again, a lack of identification with the group in which they were categorised resulted in unwillingness to engage in behaviour that might benefit the group.

WHY BEHAVE IN LINE WITH EXTERNAL CATEGORISATIONS?

In the previous section we have argued that internal categorisations do not necessarily reflect externally imposed group memberships, and we have shown that people are generally more inclined to behave in terms of a particular categorisation to the extent that they consider it more subjectively self-defining. However, in many social situations we cannot avoid being aware of how we are considered by others, and as a result feel pressure to present the self in line with external expectations. Therefore, we now consider the possibility that people may be induced to comply with what is normative for the group to which they are externally assigned, for socially instrumental reasons, rather than because of internal definitions of self. We argue that this may be the case both when associating the self with the group is profitable for the individual in question (e.g., because inclusion in the group yields social or material benefits, see also Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976), and when a failure to comply with group norms might be sanctioned by others (i.e., to avoid deviance or exclusion from the group, see also Goffman, 1963). We now address each of these conditions in turn, in an attempt to specify different psychological mechanisms that might elicit group-normative behaviour among those who lack an intrinsic motivation to do so.
Personal profitability

For those who do not define the self as a group member, achieving prestige by associating with a prestigious group may provide an alternative reason to align with that group and adopt group norms. Indeed, it has been pointed out that membership in socially valued groups may contribute to the social standing and hence the self-esteem of individual group members (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Accordingly, research has consistently revealed that—regardless of the extent to which this group membership is intrinsically meaningful to them—people are generally quite willing to present themselves as group members and behave in accordance with group norms when the group has high social standing or is otherwise positively distinct from other groups (see Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers & Barreto, 2000, for overviews).

This was also found by Finchilescu (1986), who directly examined whether people would be willing to behave in line with an external category to which they had not chosen to belong, as a function of the relative status of the chosen and the external categories. In this study, participants were first asked to which group they wished to belong, and were subsequently categorised either in the group of their choice or in another group. The relative status of the groups was manipulated, so that one of the two groups had higher status than the other. Participants who were categorised in the group of their choice displayed ingroup favouring bias regardless of the group’s status. By contrast, participants categorised into the group to which they had not chosen to belong only displayed ingroup bias when the group in which they had been categorised had high status, and not when it had low status.

Our interpretation that this response stems from individual instrumentality considerations, instead of from the inherent self-relevance of the group, is supported by additional data from the study by Doosje et al. (2002) on group status evolution over time that we described above. In a later phase of this study, we led participants to believe that, while their group’s performance had initially been worse than the performance of the other group, this had in the meantime improved so that their group now outperformed the other group. Those who had initially identified strongly with the group remained highly identified, regardless of whether the group’s performance had improved or remained the same, again attesting to the intrinsic nature of their involvement. By contrast, however, participants who had declined to identify with the group as long as its performance was inferior, were suddenly eager to define themselves as group members after the group had improved its standing. These data clearly show that, when membership in the group may reflect positively upon individual members, this may lead them to align with the group even
when they do not consider their membership in the group as intrinsically meaningful.

Another way in which individuals may benefit from the group, and therefore may be inclined to attach more importance to their membership in the group, is when they derive interpersonal esteem from other group members which they are less likely to obtain in another group. This possibility was examined in a recent study by Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, and Doosje (2002). They classified research participants into experimental groups but then had group members allegedly exchange personal information and rate each other on the basis of this information. In this way, Branscombe et al. (2002) orthogonally manipulated the amount of interpersonal respect individual participants received from other group members as well as the prestige accorded to their group by members of the other group. Subsequently, Branscombe et al. assessed the amount of additional time participants were willing to invest in their group. The results of this study revealed that when the group in itself was not attractive (because it had low prestige) people were nevertheless quite willing to invest time in serving the group’s interest when they were individually respected by their fellow group members. Thus, when aligning with the group may yield desirable individual outcomes (such as group-based prestige or interpersonal respect) people will tend to more willingly adapt their behaviour to external categorisations, even if these have not been internalised.

Possibility of sanction

An alternative reason for complying with group norms has to do with the likelihood that others may be able to sanction behaviour that is not group-normative, depending on the identifiability vs anonymity of group members. While external categorisations do not elicit internal motivations to follow group norms, they are associated with group-based expectations as to how one should behave. When one is perceived as belonging to a specific group, the norms associated with that group determine the behavioural expectations that apply to the individual in question. Lack of compliance with these norms will tend to reflect negatively upon the self (e.g., Marques et al., 1988) and hence constitutes an important threat to social acceptance (Baumeister, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Therefore, we argue that situations that foster behavioural control by others create normative pressures that may lead group members to endorse group norms even when they are not privately inclined to do so.

The idea that people’s concerns with self-presentation affect the way they behave is included in most traditional models of social influence (see Turner, 1991, for a review). It is generally assumed that people tend to adapt their behaviour to what they deem normative for the situation at hand, even if
this is not reflected in a private change of attitudes (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). However, research examining the behavioural consequences of social category memberships usually relies on paradigms that ensure the confidentiality of group members’ responses, so that self-presentational motives are unlikely to emerge. Therefore, we set out to explicitly create conditions that would enable us to assess whether the possibility of social sanctions might induce people to comply with group norms. For this purpose, we conducted a series of studies that systematically compared public vs private expressions of group-relevant responses, in order to test whether group members would consistently display the same behaviour regardless of its public or private nature (which would be indicative of an internal motivation to behave in this way), or whether they would strategically adapt their responses depending on the extent to which others were in a position to monitor and perhaps even sanction their behaviour (consistent with the notion that external, self-presentational considerations may play a role).

In a first study (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000, Study 1), individual participants were assigned to groups, allegedly on the basis of their problem-solving style, and a distinction was made between those who had internalised this categorisation (high identifiers) and those who were less inclined to regard their membership in this group as self-relevant (low identifiers). Participants then performed a group problem-solving task, and received feedback conveying that their group’s performance had been below average. Subsequently, they were given the choice to work over eight trials either at the improvement of their group’s performance, or at the improvement of their personal performance. It was made clear that the group as a whole would benefit most if group members would opt to work on the improvement of their collective performance. Furthermore, the behavioural choices that had to be made (either to work with the group or individually), would either remain completely confidential, or would be open to scrutiny from fellow ingroup members.

The results of this study showed that those who had internalised their group membership (high identifiers) opted to work with the group regardless of the experimental condition they were in, thus testifying to their internal motivation to adapt their behaviour to what would benefit the group. However, participants who primarily experienced the categorisation as externally imposed (low identifiers), adapted their behaviour, depending on whether it was private or public (see top panel of Table 1). That is, when they were convinced that their choices would remain anonymous, these participants declined to work at the improvement of their group’s performance, and instead opted to work for themselves. However, in the condition where they thought they might be accountable for their choices towards other ingroup members, they brought their behaviour in line with
group goals, resulting in a display of group-oriented behaviour that did not differ significantly from that of high identifiers. This supports our contention that, even when the internal motivation to do so is lacking, those for whom the group is not inherently meaningful might nevertheless be sensitive to external normative pressures to follow group norms. Additionally, response latencies revealed that while in the ingroup accountable condition there was no difference between high and low identifiers in terms of their choice behaviour, compared to high identifiers, low identifiers actually took more time to solve the problems. This was interpreted as a sign that they worked less hard at the group task, which is consistent with the notion that their motivation to opt for the group task was determined by external factors, while high identifiers are more internally driven.

These findings were replicated and extended in a second study (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000, Study 2). In addition to distinguishing between high and low identifiers, and studying their behavioural choices under different conditions of accountability/anonymity, this time the content of the group norm was also varied. That is, depending on the experimental condition, group members were either led to believe that other group members expected them to work for the group, or that both behavioural options (working for the group or working individually) were accepted by the group. As can be seen in Table 1 (bottom panel), when the norm was to work with the group, the

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Adapted from Barreto and Ellemers (2000), *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* (pp. 997–998), copyright © by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, reprinted by permission of Sage Publications. Scores range from 0 (only choices to work individually) to 8 (only choices to work with the group). Only differences between means with different superscript are significant ($p < .05$). Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
previously observed pattern was replicated: those who identified strongly with the group opted to work for the group regardless of whether their choices were made privately or in public, while low identifiers whose private preference was to work individually adapted their behaviour to the group norm when accountable to other ingroup members. However, when there was no such clear group norm these differences disappeared. Importantly, while in the ambiguous norm condition the overt behaviour of high and low identifiers was similar, only high identifiers reported that they had made their choices out of a concern with group goals. Thus, the comparison between situations with different social norms confirms that public accountability *per se* is not enough to elicit group-oriented behaviour. Instead, the notion that others may monitor and sanction one's behaviour makes group members more aware that their behaviour may be checked against group norms. However, the content of these norms determines the nature of the behaviour that is shown.

To summarise, the studies reviewed above show that in addition to internal considerations, external factors may also lead people to behave according to group norms. Previously we have seen that when the group constitutes an important part of one’s individual identity, this provides an intrinsic motivation to do what seems best for the group. In this section we have argued that when such internal motivation is lacking, the awareness that others perceive the self as a group member may still elicit group-normative behaviour, either because aligning with the group may yield individually attractive outcomes (e.g., high group status, interpersonal respect), or because it may help avoid social disapproval or exclusion.

**BALANCING IDENTITY EXPRESSION WITH SELF-PRESENTATION**

Now that we have demonstrated that concerns with positive presentation of the individual self may lead people to act as group members, we will examine how self-presentational concerns can interfere with the expression of internalised social identities. Our reasoning here is based on a recently developed theoretical model proposing that social behaviour tends to be informed by self-presentation considerations that can refer to different levels of self (Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects – SIDE, Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Spears & Lea, 1994). According to this view, people are not only concerned with their individual reputation, but they also care about how others see their social self, which may cause them to engage in impression management targeting their individual as well as their social identity.

The idea that we care about how we present ourselves to others is also implied in the central tenets of social identity theory. Indeed, Tajfel’s early
work postulates that we are motivated to establish a positive social identity, implying that we not only wish to think positively about ourselves, but also aim to achieve recognition of these self-views from others (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Indeed, the strategies that people may follow to secure a positive identity all aim to improve external views of the self, even though some focus primarily on managing the individual’s standing in relation to positively evaluated groups (e.g., individual mobility), while others aim at securing a positive evaluation for the group as a whole (e.g., social creativity). Further developing the social identity perspective, Reicher and colleagues (e.g., Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b; Reicher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998) have focused on the expressive context in which identities are enacted (Reicher, 2000), in order to understand how people manage their social identities when communicating to different audiences. Based on and extending this work, the research reviewed in this section illustrates three different reasons why identity expression is often balanced with self-presentation: because when expressing their identity people need to take into account the various norms present in a given context, because they need to manage multiple identities to different audiences, and because there are psychological costs involved in the management of one’s social identity.

Identity expression and outgroup norms

A concern with how one is regarded by others may lead people to tailor the way they characterise their group-based identity to take into account the social norms that are salient in a given context (see also Ellemers et al., 1999a). However, in many social situations different groups are present, involving not just one, but rather multiple and possibly contradictory behavioural norms. As a result, the desire to act in ways that are normative for the ingroup may be curbed by the awareness that this goes against other and perhaps more broadly held social norms. To examine this process, Reicher and Levine (1994a, 1994b) compared endorsement of group norms in the presence of ingroup members only, and in front of both ingroup as well as outgroup members. They found that group members avoided defending group normative attitudes that were likely to be sanctioned by the outgroup when communicating with the mixed audience (see also Klein & Azzi, 2001; Reicher et al., 1998). In a similar vein, Plant and Devine (1998) showed that endorsement of negative stereotypes held by the ingroup (White Americans) about the outgroup (Black Americans) was constrained when stereotype endorsement was made in public conditions (see also Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, & Sechrist, 2002).

However, not all ingroup characteristic attitudes or behaviours will meet with disapproval of others outside the group. For instance, whereas
the management of Schiphol Airport (Amsterdam) reject environmentalist views that they should refrain from building another airport terminal, the airport works together with environmental groups in projects to improve air quality and plant life around the airport. Thus, as long as core values of other groups are not challenged, members of other groups will tend to accept ingroup normative behaviour. As a consequence, the awareness that other groups hold different norms will only constrain identity expression in domains that are central to the identity of those other groups. In fact, Reicher and Levine (1994a, 1994b) found that in the presence of ingroup and outgroup members, research participants actually enhanced endorsement of those ingroup norms that seemed acceptable to the outgroup. This illustrates how people take into account outgroup norms when expressing their identity: identity expression involves affirming what is normative for the ingroup, while avoiding public violation of outgroup norms.

In a similar vein, Ellemers, Van Dyck, Hinkle, and Jacobs (2000) examined how group members portray their group, depending on the social norms that are relevant in a given context. They assessed how members of different student sports societies described their group’s performance as a function of whether these ratings remained private, or were shared with other participants (Ellemers et al., 2000, Study 1). Results of this study revealed that students who were aware that the perceived status of their group was relatively low, maintained that their group was superior to other groups when their responses remained private. However, when they expected their ratings to be made public, exposing them to the norms held by others outside the group, no such ingroup-favouring ratings were given. That is, participants adapted their descriptions of what was characteristic of the group depending on whether or not their judgements were likely to violate normative views held by others.

In a second study, using a similar methodology (Ellemers et al., 2000, Study 2), the authors went one step further to examine whether differential sensitivity to ingroup and outgroup norms was displayed depending on the extent to which research participants actually identified with the group (in this case, the university where they studied). It turned out that low and high identifiers presented the ingroup differently when outgroup norms were salient. Those who identified strongly with their university resisted evidence suggesting that students of their university might be inferior, and maintained that both groups of students were equally competent regardless of whether or not they were exposed to outgroup norms. While low identifiers also rated students from their own university equally favourably as students from the other university under private circumstances, they conceded their group’s alleged inferiority when outgroup members were present. That is, they adapted their responses to outgroup norms when giving their ratings in
These results show that while high identifiers behave in line with what is normative for the ingroup without yielding to alternative norms, low identifiers in particular tend to avoid the social costs that they may incur when such behaviour violates outgroup norms.

Expression of multiple identities to multiple audiences

We now examine how people monitor the interplay between internal identities and external categorisations by adapting expressions of group allegiance when communicating their identity to different audiences (see also Barreto, 2000). In particular, we focus on issues of self-presentation that emerge when managing self-descriptions by reference to the multiple group memberships that can characterise one’s identity. In line with the argument drawn here, we posit that to avoid making claims that are not accepted or deemed credible by the audience, people are likely to adapt the way they describe their identity to the specific audience they address (Schlenker, 1980). We have argued that people refrain from making identity claims that can violate the norms of the particular audience they address, while they may maintain such claims when the audience is not expected to challenge them. According to the SIDE model, this is particularly likely to happen when group members are personally identifiable, because these circumstances heighten the possibility that social costs will actually be incurred by the individual in question (Spears & Lea, 1994; see also Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001).

To examine this issue, we assessed statements of identification with native and host communities among Portuguese migrants in the Netherlands, depending on whether they communicated with a Portuguese or with a Dutch audience (Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, & Shahinper, 2003, Study 2). The nature of the audience was manipulated by varying the language in which the questionnaires were written (Portuguese vs Dutch). In addition, orthogonal to the manipulation of group audience, we manipulated whether or not respondents were personally identifiable to the audience in question (anonymous vs identifiable). The results showed that when personally identifiable to a particular audience, migrants downplayed claims to group memberships that they thought the audience might question. Indeed, migrants do not satisfy all criteria that contribute to defining membership in either native or host groups (e.g., residence and place of birth, respectively), and since personal identifiability allows fulfilment of these criteria to be scrutinised, it functions so as to constrain identity claims. That is, compared to the condition where they were anonymous, identifiable Portuguese migrants downplayed their Portuguese identity to a Portuguese audience, and refrained from claiming a Dutch
identity to a Dutch audience (see Table 2), although identification with the Portuguese always remained stronger than identification with the Dutch. Importantly, in the anonymous condition, that is when there was no threat of having one’s identity claims disregarded as invalid or not credible, people felt more free to describe themselves in ways that challenge externally imposed category boundaries (see also Spears et al., 2001).

In sum, when migrants experience a potential discrepancy between their internal sense of identity and the way in which they are externally categorised by others (see also Deaux & Ethier, 1998; Hutnik, 1991; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Phinney, 1990; Verkuyten, 1997), these data suggest that their expressions of group allegiances take into account both the enhancement opportunities that public expressions provide, and the constraints that specific audiences may present. On the one hand, as long as individuals are not personally identifiable, public identity expressions provide the ideal stage to express one’s internal definition of the social self. On the other, identity expressions may be constrained when one is personally identifiable to an audience that is in a position to scrutinise the validity of these identity claims. Thus, similar to the power of sanction an audience may have according to Reicher and Levine (1994a, 1994b) we propose that an audience may also constrain identity expression with the “power of knowledge”, referring to the awareness that the audience is in the position to know the limits of one’s identity claims (see Barreto et al., 2003).

| Table 2 |

Expressions of Portuguese and Dutch identity as a function of audience and identifiability among Portuguese migrants in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity expression</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.97)</td>
<td>(1.54)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiable</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted with permission from the British Journal of Social Psychology © 2003 by the British Psychological Society (Barreto et al., 2003; Study 2). Scores range from 1 (not at all identified with the group) to 7 (very much identified with the group). Only differences between means with different superscripts are reliable ($p < .05$). Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
The psychological costs of social identity management

We have argued that the public expression of internal identities can be adapted to avoid violation of (outgroup) norms, or to convey one’s perception of self to different audiences. Both types of situations thus imply that people are able to selectively focus on those parts of their identity that they wish to convey to others present in the situation. When the essence of one’s social identity is strongly devalued by others (e.g., for homosexuals), the resulting threat to the value of the target’s identity (Branscombe et al., 1999; Ellemers et al., 2002), can exacerbate the threat of categorisation. This may lead people to distance the self from the devalued identity in order to enhance self-presentation, such as when they emphasise their difference from the remaining group members (e.g., Spears et al., 1997). In extreme cases, people may even choose to hide the devalued identity and pass as members of a category to which they do not belong (on the basis of internal and external membership criteria), but which provides them with a more positive identity (Goffman, 1963; Katz, 1981; Tajfel, 1981). For instance, people with a severe mental or physical illness sometimes hide their devalued identity from their colleagues at work, because they wish to be regarded as regular co-workers (e.g., Holmes & River, 1998; Lee & Craft, 2002). In these cases, people hide a “real” identity—in the sense that it stems from fulfilment of objective criteria, and is granted with psychological significance—and falsely try to present themselves on the basis of another identity.

In the literature, such passing attempts are often seen to represent a primary identity-management strategy to cope with membership in devalued groups (see also Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). Although use of this strategy has been documented, it is unclear what the identity consequences are when people aim for an external categorisation that does not correspond to their internal self-definition. On the one hand, people who choose to pass in this context are likely to do so in the belief that this will improve the expectations that others have of them. According to this belief, passing may help deflect the threat of being associated with the group’s negative stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995) and thereby improve self-confidence. In fact, whereas members of devalued groups are often aware of the negative expectations that others have of them (e.g., Cohen & Swim, 1995) and report lower self-confidence in performance contexts (e.g., Lord & Saenz, 1985; Stangor, Carr, & Kiang, 1998), categorisation in a more valued group often boosts self-confidence (e.g., Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). It is thus possible that achieving external categorisation as a member of a more positively evaluated group improves self-confidence.

On the other hand, however, there is empirical evidence to suggest that passing can also be associated with psychological costs that can ultimately
undermine self-confidence. This can be understood when we consider that passing not only involves falsely claiming a more positive external categorisation, but also implies that people aim to hide an internal identity that is devalued. This latter aspect of passing in particular can be associated with psychological costs, for instance the experience of shame and guilt (Goffman, 1963; Major & Gramzow, 1999; Paxton, 2002; Smart & Wegner, 2000). At the same time, suppression of a stigmatised identity has been associated with increased accessibility of that identity (e.g., Smart & Wegner, 1999, 2000). Thus, attempts to pass can be expected to increase the cognitive salience of one’s internal identity, while the awareness that this identity is devalued by others is predicted to elicit emotional distress. In turn, these combined effects may well undermine the self-confidence of those who try to pass.

To examine this issue, we assessed how members of a contextually devalued group felt about themselves and their abilities, and compared the responses of those who were passing as a member of a more positively evaluated group to the responses of those who revealed their devalued identity (Barreto, Ellemers, & Banal, 2003). Participants were asked to perform a task involving writing about pairs of paintings. This task was to be first performed individually, and subsequently with one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) partners. Participants were told that they would not need to know much about Art to be successful at this task, however they were told that the partner(s) had expressed a wish to be paired with a student of Art. In this way, participants’ identity was defined as contextually devalued. Half of our participants were induced to hide their real major and indicate to their partners that they studied Art (the desired identity), rather than Psychology (their real identity). The remaining participants were led to reveal their real major (Psychology) to their partners.

The results showed that passing as a member of a more positively evaluated group can indeed have beneficial effects, in the sense that people think this will improve the expectations others hold about them. At the same time, however, our results illustrate the downside of this passing strategy, as it implies denial of one’s internal definition of social self. Specifically, compared to participants who exposed their devalued identity, research participants who passed reported more shame and guilt (see also Frijda, 1986). Furthermore, mediational analyses revealed that these negative emotional responses in turn lowered the self-confidence of those who were trying to pass as members of a more positively evaluated group, whereas no such negative effects on psychological well-being were observed among research participants who revealed their devalued identity.

In sum, although trying to change the way one is externally categorised is often considered a primary identity management strategy and its use is well documented, it appears that pursuit of this strategy may carry negative
consequences for the self. Thus, in the extreme case that self-presentational considerations would require people to deny or relinquish their internal views of self altogether, the psychological costs they are likely to incur may outweigh the possible social gains. In sum, although, as we have shown at the beginning of this section, people may seek to express their internal identity in ways that are most likely to be socially accepted, our research suggests that such attempts to manage external views of one’s identity will be less desirable as they more clearly violate internal definitions of self.

**WHEN DO PEOPLE ADAPT INTERNAL IDENTITIES?**

The research reviewed in the previous section indicated that people are sensitive to external views of themselves when choosing how to express their identities. However, the influence of external self-views on identity expression is not limited to the introduction of particular self-presentation concerns. In this section, we review evidence indicating that under some circumstances external categories may actually become internalised into an individual’s psychological make-up, and hence develop into a consistent basis for social behaviour.

The ability to internalise new identities is fundamental to any process of socialisation, as when people enter a new profession or work organisation. In these cases, it is crucial both for the individuals involved and for the category that incorporates them (e.g., the organisation) that the new identity is internalised successfully. As we have argued above, such internalisation is a necessary condition for normative behaviour to emerge across a variety of contexts, so that people are willing to engage in discretionary efforts for the benefit of the collective, or continue to behave in ways that are normative for the group in the absence of instrumental rewards or direct supervision by others. Importantly, our previous discussion of the instrumental reasons people may have to behave in line with group norms, addresses a different class of situations, where behavioural displays do not reflect privately held beliefs about the self (see also Festinger, 1957). We now examine the circumstances under which people may actually internalise an external categorisation.

**The importance of multiple identities**

We argue that one important factor that may lead people to internalise membership in a group in which they have been categorised is whether they feel that their initial sense of identity remains valid (Barreto & Ellemers, 2002). That is, we propose that external categorisations are more likely to be accepted and internalised when they can be incorporated into (instead of having to replace) people’s existing definition of self. For instance, a female
professional who is suddenly seen as a “mother” after she has her first baby, may be more inclined to accept this new identity when she can think of herself as a “working mother” (as in subtyping). Thus, the adoption of external categorisations by others requires a more complex representation comprising multiple identities, so as to avoid resistance resulting from threat to prior identities.

Research on prejudice reduction through the introduction of a common ingroup identity provides some evidence in support of this reasoning. It shows that imposing a super-ordinate categorisation that members of different groups had in common did not reduce intergroup bias, and in certain cases even led to increased antagonism (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; see also Haunschild, Moreland, & Murrell, 1994; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001 in the context of organisational mergers). However, intergroup competition and bias were successfully reduced when people who were addressed on the basis of a (new) super-ordinate identity were also encouraged to maintain their (prior) sub-group identity (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; see also Gonzales & Brown, 1999; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). This research is consistent with the general idea that people may be prepared to see themselves in terms of an imposed (higher-order) category provided that other (in this case lower-order) identities are also acknowledged.

One of the processes responsible for this response is a threat to the distinctiveness of the ingroup’s identity: imposing a super-ordinate category to subsume the ingroup as well as the outgroup threatens the distinctiveness of the ingroup’s identity, resulting in expressions of ingroup bias. This threat can be avoided when people are addressed on the basis of multiple (subgroup as well as super-ordinate) identities (see also Brewer, 1991; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Van Leeuwen & Van Knippenberg, 2003). Additionally, imposing an external categorisation to replace internal self-views may represent a categorisation threat (Brancombe et al., 1999; Breakwell, 1986; Ellemers et al., 2002), as it implies that one’s internalised identity is not acknowledged by others. Here we argue that acceptance of the imposed identity can be facilitated when established identities can also be maintained in a representation of self on the basis of multiple identities. By contrast, when people feel they have to choose between a definition of self in terms of one category membership or the other, external categorisation represents a pressure to relinquish their existing identity. Under those circumstances, people will tend to assert their original identity both by behaving in line with their internalised views of self (e.g., by displaying behaviour that is normative for their internalised group membership) and by actively rejecting the categorisation that is imposed upon them.
The importance of treatment by others

When examining whether or not internalisation of a category membership is facilitated if self-chosen identities are also taken into account, and hindered if one’s previous identity is discarded, it is important to distinguish between the way a target is externally categorised from the way a target is actually treated by others (Barreto & Ellemers, 2002). Indeed, these two do not necessarily go together. The particular way in which a target is categorised depends on factors that are often not under conscious control of the perceiver, such as cognitive salience of the category membership, due to visibility of categorisation cues (e.g., gender and race; Fiske, 1998). However, perceivers can still be sensitive to the internalised identities of their targets and treat them with respect for their chosen definitions of self. For instance, although a female’s gender identity in a professional context may be highly salient to her colleagues, and hence they may not be able to avoid categorising her as a woman, they do have the choice to either treat her according to her gender identity or approach her in terms of her professional identity.

From the target’s point of view, it is the treatment they receive from others rather than the fact that internal and external categorisations are discrepant per se that is the crucial determinant of the psychological and behavioural consequences of such discrepancy. Treating a target in terms of an externally assigned category membership may imply categorisation threat and elicit resistance to the imposed group membership, for instance by showing behavioural affirmation of the self-chosen identity. However, as long as the target’s internalised identity is acknowledged, such a discrepancy between internal and external categorisations will tend to be less problematic. That is, the female target in the example above may accept that her gender is a highly salient categorisation cue to others, as long as they respect her choice to focus on her professional identity. For instance, she may be perfectly willing to provide “a women’s view” on work-related issues. By contrast, when others fail to respect her choice of self-definition, as when they comment on her clothing style when she expects feedback on her work, she is more likely to affirm her professional identity and resist a categorisation on the basis of her gender.

We examined this issue in an experiment with artificially created groups, which allowed us to independently manipulate discrepancy between an internal and an external categorisation on the one hand and respect of others for a self-chosen identity on the other (Barreto & Ellemers, 2002). Participants were given information regarding two styles of thinking (i.e., inductive and deductive thinkers), and asked to choose which style of thinking they considered most self-descriptive. Subsequently, participants took a test that allegedly could help categorise them into one of these two
groups, but they were told that neither their own estimate, nor the test, constituted fully reliable means of assessing their style of thinking. The experimental manipulation consisted of either telling people that the result of the test converged with their own estimate (convergent condition), or leading them to believe that the test results disconfirmed their own views on which style of thinking was most characteristic for them (discrepant condition). Furthermore, in the discrepant condition, participants were either informed that they would be placed in the self-chosen group for the duration of the experiment (respect for self-chosen identity), or that they were assigned to the group that seemed most appropriate according to the test (neglect of self-chosen identity).

Reactions to this treatment were subsequently assessed by examining expressions of subjective group identification and monitoring the extent to which participants displayed loyalty to the group in which they were placed. To measure group loyalty, we first provided feedback that the ingroup had performed poorly on a group task, and assessed participants’ willingness to work on group improvement. Moreover, in order to make sure that displays of loyalty were indeed specific to the group in question, we manipulated which behavioural strategy for group improvement was seen as normative for the group (see also Barreto & Ellemers, 2000, Study 2).

In line with our predictions, we observed that participants in the discrepant condition who were placed in the group of their own choice (respect for self-chosen identity), identified more strongly with and behaved more in line with the norms of the group in which they were placed than participants who were assigned to work in the group that was appropriate according to the test (neglect of self-chosen identity). In fact, participants in the discrepant condition whose self-chosen identity was respected did not differ from participants in the convergent condition in terms of their responses on these measures. This is consistent with our position that it is the way people are treated by others, rather than the inconsistency between internal and external membership criteria in itself, that determines their psychological group allegiances. Moreover, additional mediational analyses showed that subjective feelings of identification with the group in which they were placed mediated the extent to which participants behaved in line with group norms. That is, participants in the convergent and discrepant/respected conditions behaved more in line with the norms of the group in which they worked because they identified with that group, whereas participants in the discrepant/neglected condition did not follow the norms of the group in which they worked during the experiment because they did not subjectively identify as members of that group.

Furthermore, and crucial to our argument, in all conditions we examined how participants related to the group in which they had been externally categorised by assessing identification and willingness to co-operate with the
group that emerged from the test as most appropriate for them. The results revealed that participants whose own choice of identity had been respected also identified with the group in which they were categorised by the test, and expressed willingness to co-operate with this group. By contrast, participants whose self-chosen identity had been neglected, neither identified nor expressed willingness to co-operate with the externally ascribed group, but instead directed their effort at affirming the internalised identity that was neglected in the experiment. In sum, participants whose own choice of identity was respected, identified with the internally chosen as well as the externally assigned categorisations, whereas participants whose choice of identity was neglected, resisted identification with the external category while they identified strongly with the internally appropriate category (see Table 3).

These results suggest that the consequences of a lack of respect for important self-identities are not only felt by the target (in his or her sense of identity) but also by the group in which the target is categorised (Barreto & Ellemers, 2002): people try to convincingly demonstrate allegiance to the chosen identity by distancing themselves from the externally ascribed group and refrain from displaying loyalty to that group. To illustrate, a female worker who is frequently addressed on the basis of her gender may downplay her gender identity, and distance herself from any action to promote gender equality, because this is likely to enhance the salience of that identity to others, and therefore may seem to further undermine her possibility of being treated as a regular colleague by her co-workers (see also Ellemers, 2001).

In this section we have shown that, although externally ascribed group memberships may be seen as constraints to valued identities when self-chosen identities are neglected, as long as internalised identities are respected, additional ascribed identities may come to be regarded as

| TABLE 3 |
| Identification with internal and external categories as a function of treatment |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Internal category respected</th>
<th>Internal category neglected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal category</td>
<td>3.94^{ab} (1.00)</td>
<td>4.25^{a} (.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External category</td>
<td>3.80^{b} (.89)</td>
<td>3.57^{c} (1.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Barreto and Ellemers (2002), *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* (p. 635), copyright © by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, reprinted by permission of Sage Publications. Scores range from 1 (not at all identified with the group) to 7 (very much identified with the group). Only differences between means with different superscript are significant ($p < .05$). Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
possible ways of defining the self. Thus, a discrepancy between internal and
external membership criteria in itself is not a sufficient condition for identity
threat to be experienced, nor for identity affirmation to occur. Instead, the
understanding that one can be categorised on the basis of multiple criteria
can alleviate the experience of threat due to external categorisation by
others. That is, when identities that are important to the self can be
maintained because they are respected by others, an additional assigned
categorisation can form the basis of a multifaceted identity.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have reviewed evidence demonstrating that individuals do
not necessarily endorse identities that are externally ascribed to them, and
that as consequence displays of group allegiance cannot simply be derived
from the knowledge that people satisfy certain external criteria for category
inclusion. In times of heightened inter-ethnic vigilance, it is even more
important to be aware that as external observers we are often mistaken in
our conclusions about who people actually are, what they stand for, or how
they are likely to behave. Mistakes of this kind were responsible for several
instances of unjustified ill-treatment in the past, such as the frequently
reported mistrust and derogation of American Muslims in the aftermath of
September 11, irrespective of whether their primary allegiance was to their
identity as American citizens or to the Muslim cause. Empirical evidence
further illustrates that mistakes such as these are not inconsequential. In an
attempt to correct external views on their identity that they consider
inappropriate, people often engage in strategies intended to affirm their
desired identities. Whether or not this identity affirmation will (further)
undermine the relationship between individuals and those who categorise
them will depend on the particular strategies that people employ to express
their resistance. Thus, a first conclusion is that people try to influence how
others see their social identities, by rejecting categorisations that they do not
endorse, and affirming identities that they find subjectively meaningful.

We also argue that it would be too simplistic to conclude that external
categorisations have no impact on the behaviour of those who are
categorised, or even on their identity. We have reviewed evidence showing
that at a more superficial level, people may behave in line with group norms
because they expect some personal (material or social) gain from such
behaviour. Furthermore, we demonstrated some examples of external views
impacting upon self-identities in a process of identity negotiation, as the
awareness of what will be accepted by others constrains which aspects of self
are enacted in public. Thus, the examination of these issues reminds us that
identity management is an interactive process that can be adapted to
confront the views and expectations held by different audiences (see also
Emler & Reicher, 1995). Therefore, a second conclusion is that while we tend to place great value on our own subjective sense of self, we neither can nor want to ignore what others think of us—we wish to avoid social costs and, whenever and in what ways possible, we wish to persuade others of how we view ourselves.

However, external views of oneself can also have a deeper impact and become internalised into the individual’s self-concept. This will only happen if external views are not experienced as a threat to a prior sense of self. The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that respect for prior identities can eliminate the threat that elicits resistance to alternative external categorisations. In modern societies, where social cohesion relies on a common identification with nation states rather than with ethnic groups, this means that only a respect for ethnic differences can promote a sense of common citizenship. In this way what starts off as an external, and therefore psychologically meaningless, categorisation may come to represent a valued identity, just as we hope that valued identities will eventually determine the way others categorise the self. In this sense, internal and external categorisations of the self are in constant interaction.

While previous investigations have focused on the relationship between an individual and a particular group as determining whether people are driven to exert themselves in favour of that group, the research reviewed here clearly demonstrates that the relationship between the individual and the group may be affected by identity needs raised by alternative group memberships. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that multiple identities also raise multiple identity needs, and that these cannot be seen as isolated from each other. The work reviewed here addresses this issue by examining how people portray themselves by reference to multiple identities, which characterise multiple perspectives on the self. Although the idea that people may simultaneously identify with multiple groups, defined at different levels of abstraction, may appear at first sight to contradict the notion of functional antagonism in social identity, these views can be reconciled when considering that super-ordinate identities may in fact be defined by reference to the inclusion of subordinate ones (Haslam, 2000; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). For instance, Europeans are only likely to identify as European as long as this category is defined with reference to the diverse nations and cultures it includes. Although possibly less obvious, similar processes operate when thinking of what can promote citizenship among migrants: identification as a citizen of a host nation requires a definition of this nation’s identity as sufficiently diverse to incorporate migrants as well as the indigenous population. Obviously, application of the ideas developed in this chapter to real-life examples raises additional issues and questions underlining that, while this review
aims to contribute to our understanding of the more complex processes involved in the interactive functioning of multiple identities, it only constitutes a first step in opening up this new avenue of theoretical development and research.

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